A THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR HIGH-LOW PRICE IN RETAILING MARKETS

Authors

  • José Contreras Escuela de Economía UCV

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54642/rvac.v11i1.10679

Keywords:

Retailing industry, everyday low price, temporary deep discounts, game theory and perfect nash equilibrium in a finitely repeated game

Abstract

The main goal in this paper is to build an economics environment in a framework of game theorysuch that the equilibrium solution for prices that the firms set given the optimal strategies ofconsumers follows patterns of prices that characterize a Hi-Lo pricing system.This paper proposes a model in which the consumers optimize, for the given prices, their utilityfunction to choose their search strategy ,so that, this model links market structure, consumercharacteristics and imperfect information to the nature of HI-LO pricing strategy. It shows thatthe distribution of consumers who buy at random plays an important role in determining whetheror not firms will find it optimal to use price promotions (High-Low pricing strategy). Theequilibrium is a unique Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a finitely repeated game.

Author Biography

José Contreras, Escuela de Economía UCV

Escuela de Economía UCV

How to Cite

Contreras, J. (2016). A THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR HIGH-LOW PRICE IN RETAILING MARKETS. Revista Venezolana De Análisis De Coyuntura, 11(1). https://doi.org/10.54642/rvac.v11i1.10679

Issue

Section

Artículos

Most read articles by the same author(s)

Obs.: This plugin requires at least one statistics/report plugin to be enabled. If your statistics plugins provide more than one metric then please also select a main metric on the admin's site settings page and/or on the journal manager's settings pages.

Similar Articles

> >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.