A THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR HIGH-LOW PRICE IN RETAILING MARKETS

Autores/as

  • José Contreras Escuela de Economía UCV

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54642/rvac.v11i1.10679

Palabras clave:

Retailing industry, everyday low price, temporary deep discounts, game theory and perfect nash equilibrium in a finitely repeated game

Resumen

The main goal in this paper is to build an economics environment in a framework of game theorysuch that the equilibrium solution for prices that the firms set given the optimal strategies ofconsumers follows patterns of prices that characterize a Hi-Lo pricing system.This paper proposes a model in which the consumers optimize, for the given prices, their utilityfunction to choose their search strategy ,so that, this model links market structure, consumercharacteristics and imperfect information to the nature of HI-LO pricing strategy. It shows thatthe distribution of consumers who buy at random plays an important role in determining whetheror not firms will find it optimal to use price promotions (High-Low pricing strategy). Theequilibrium is a unique Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a finitely repeated game.

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Biografía del autor/a

José Contreras, Escuela de Economía UCV

Escuela de Economía UCV

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Cómo citar

Contreras, J. (2016). A THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR HIGH-LOW PRICE IN RETAILING MARKETS. Revista Venezolana De Análisis De Coyuntura, 11(1). https://doi.org/10.54642/rvac.v11i1.10679

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