George H. Mead´s early philosophy spots a hidden dualism in the original enactivist doctrine of compassion

Abstract

G.H. Mead’s early writings advanced an insightful conception of the self before his renowned theory of self-development as it is found in Mind, Self, and Society (Mead, 1934). I want to show the possible value that this philosophy has, not only in the development of his thought, but also for recent discussions of the self in the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences, especially in relation to ethical concerns. For this purpose, I argue that Mead’s criticism of G. Le Bon in the late 19th century could be used to spot an unnoticed dualism in the original formulation of the enactivist ethics in Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) that betrays their intentions of overcoming any form of dualism. Even though this does not imply that Mead is right about his incipient thought, it can at least provide us with an alternative reconstruction that is consistent with the original intentions and spirit of this enactivist ethics and its social concerns. If enaction involves complex processes of structural coupling between the organism and the environment in a continuous interactive historical process, and we recognize also that the human environment is a social environment, then, in an enactivist conception of education, ethics and politics, we need to concentrate our efforts in the social and material conditions for the emergence of compassion.