An interpretation of the I/Me distinction in G. H. Mead’s “The definition of the psychical” and H. Joas’ criticism

Resumen

The article aims to promote a continuistic interpretation of Mead's philosophical development by challenging the thesis expressed by Joas in his 1985 book about the substantial "immaturity" and contradiction of Mead's positions in “The Definition of the Psychical”. To that purpose I offer a new way of reading the role of subjectivity in Mead’s early article that allows a refutation of Joas’s criticism concerning the I-Me distinction. In this way, I hope to update this early and valuable work of pragmatism so that could be incorporated in different contemporary discussion. In the first part, I offer a reconstruction of Mead’s essential ideas that are necessary to understand the significance of the I-Me distinction. In the second part, I elaborate a refutation to prove that there is no contradiction at all, but, as a fallback, I will show that, if there is a contradiction, then, this contradiction is also present in Mind, Self, and Society, and so the continuistic reading prevails.