Incivility From the Structure of Modern Moral Discourse*

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Resumen

Los enfoques educativos del problema de la incivilidad tienden a concentrarse bien sea en inculcar hábitos cívicos, o en promover el desarrollo de competencias sociomorales. Sin embargo, en "Tras la virtud", Alasdair MacIntyre identificó a la estructura misma del discurso moral moderno como una fuente de incivilidad. MacIntyre sostiene que la naturaleza incivil del discurso moral moderno es en parte el resultado de la inconmensurabilidad conceptual y de las bases no racionales de las premisas fundamentales de cada bando. A causa de tal estructura, los debates eventualmente se reducen a una simple seguidilla de afirmaciones y contra-afirmaciones que pronto frustra a ambas partes, dando paso a intercambios estridentes e inciviles. MacIntyre recomienda al discurso dialéctico como un medio para lograr que tales debates resulten más productivos y cívicos. En el presente artículo me centro en la extensión que Daniel Vokey hace de la concepción dialéctico-discursiva de MacIntyre, para explorar sus implicaciones en el terreno de las prácticas educativas que se proponen mitigar la incivilidad.

Abstract

[*Incivility From the Structure of Modern Moral Discourse*]. Educational approaches to the problem of incivility tend to focus on either the inculcation of civil habits, or the development of social-emotional competencies. However, in "After Virtue", Alasdair MacIntyre points to the structure of modern moral discourse itself as a source of incivility. MacIntyre claims that the uncivil nature of modern moral discourse is in part the result of conceptual incommensurability and the arbitrary, non-rational basis of each side's respective foundational premises. Because of this structure, debates eventually boil down to simple assertion and counter-assertion that soon frustrates both parties, leading to shrill and uncivil exchanges. MacIntyre suggests dialectical discourse as a means for making such debate productive and civil. In this paper I use Daniel Vokey's expansion of MacIntyre's conception of dialectical discourse to explore its implications for educational practices that aim at alleviating incivility.

Palabras clave:

Educación moral, inconmensurabilidad, discurso dialéctico, equilibrio reflexivo

Key words:

Moral education, Incommensurability, Dialectical discourse, Reflexive equilibrium

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1. Introduction

On April 27th, 2010 chaos erupted in the Ukrainian House of Parliament. Tempers had been running high over a vote on whether to extend the lease on a Russian Black Sea naval air base. Videos quickly circulated of members of parliament exchanging blows and throwing water at each other in a dense cloud of smoke… the result of a smoke bomb someone had tossed into the midst of the tumbling mass of political leaders. Above this chaotic scene one can see the speaker, Volodymyr Lytvyn, hiding behind an umbrella to protect himself from eggs that were being hurled at him from the house floor.

Even the most cursory of research reveals that this event is by no means unique: Ukraine, Turkey, Jordan, Georgia, Macedonia, Afghanistan, India, Greece, Pakistan, Thailand, Israel, Italy, Somalia, South Korea, Great Britain, Venezuela, Congo, Nigeria, Germany, Taiwan, Nepal, have all recently witnessed violent outbursts in their respective governing bodies.[1] The very venues in which one expects the highest forms of civil debate, and arguably the venues where civility is especially important, are torn asunder as passions run high under the strain of seemingly irresolvable disputes.

Just as we see grossly uncivil behavior in our most powerful political bodies, so too can we find it in the least powerful demographic, our children. The United States in particular has seen a drastic rise in alarm over the problem of bullying. This concern has been prompted largely by the still unabated incidence of school shootings in which, some have argued, bullying played a role in prompting the deadly attacks (Gaughan, Cerio, & Myers, 2001; Muschert, 2007). Combine the concern with childhood bullying with the highly polemical, sound-bite mode of political discourse and it is perhaps not surprising that a nationwide study conducted in the United States demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of Americans see incivility as a pressing problem in nearly all areas of life (Weber Shandwick and Powell Tate & KRC Research, 2012).

One of the central functions of civility is to help maintain respectful and productive discourse in highly emotional contexts (Thomas, 96; Boyd, 2006). This function is vital as

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[1] Videos of these outbreaks have been collected and can be found at the aptly named webpage http://parliamentfights.wordpress.com/

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we attempt to tackle the daunting economic, political, social and environmental problems in this increasingly crowded and interconnected world. As we face these problems, emotions run high as individuals and groups struggle together to meet the unprecedented challenges of today in a way they feel is true to their particular vision of the good and the right. Often, all it takes for a violent outburst is one small uncivil act; a catalyst that, under certain conditions, can lead to dire outcomes.

In this paper I will explore what role education might play in combating incivility. In particular, I will discuss incivility that arises out of well meaning and generally respectful people pursuing coherent consensus on an ethical or political issue but being pushed to emotional breaking points in the process.[1] Ironically, moral debate is particularly fertile ground for incivility. People tend to want to view themselves as moral (Greenwald, 1980) and a critique of one's moral views can threaten one's conception of oneself as moral. Perception of self-discrepancies of this kind can lead to negative emotional states (Higgins, 1987) which strain civility. Incivility in moral and political debate is especially troubling in pluralist liberal democracies in which some degree of consensus must be attained for the sake of constructing and enacting public policy. Incivility often precedes a breakdown in discourse as the rude behavior of one or both parties soon becomes an excuse to cease what is seen as a futile endeavor. [¶5]

Two Common Approaches to the Problem of Incivility

Within the field of education, incivility is often understood as the result of either a deficient inculcation into civil habits or a deficiency in the social-emotional abilities necessary to embody commonly accepted norms of civility. As such, much of the literature on the problem of incivility focuses on either the need for greater normative inculcation (as found in many character education programs) or on the development of social-emotional skills (as found in many social-emotional learning programs). Although I will not go into a detailed analysis of the impact character education and social emotional learning programs have on civility, it is reasonable to assume that both of these approaches can make meaningful contributions to the development of civility in the context of moral and political debate.[2] Character education's emphasis on the development of civil habits can help to establish the basic dispositions and tendencies that assist one in retaining a respectful attitude in heated debates. Social-emotional learning's emphasis on the development of empathy, self-awareness and self-regulation provides students with the basic abilities

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[1] Throughout the paper I will use "ethical" and "political" as interchangeable descriptions of the type of debate I am concerned with. I do not mean to suggest that ethics and politics are one and the same, but they are interdependent and as such the method of dialectical debate could impact discourse in both realms.

[2] There exists a wide array of different character education and social-emotional programs. For a review of such programs in north America, see *Efficacy of Schoolwide Programs to Promote Social and Character Development and Reduce Problem Behavior in Elementary School Children* for character education programs, and *2013 CASEL Guide: Effective Social and Emotional Learning Programs,* for social-emotional learning programs.

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necessary to skillfully navigate the complex and affectively laden interpersonal dynamic of moral and political debate.

While civil habits and social emotional competencies would surely assist in fostering civility in debate, I want to suggest that understanding the nature of moral debate and means for productive discourse could also play a key roll in combating incivility. In this regard the work of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, 1988, 1991) and Daniel Vokey (2001) are particularly insightful.

MacIntyre On Modern Moral Discourse

In *After Virtue,* Alasdair MacIntyre describes how modern moral discourse often leads to incivility. He argues that modern moral debates have three central characteristics. First, they exhibit incommensurability. For example, one side may argue from the principle of justice, while the other side may argue from the principle of liberty. Given these two foundational premises, each side's argument may be valid. However, there is no rational way to ascertain which foundational premise should be adopted. MacIntyre writes,

> From our rival conclusions we argue back to our rival premises; but when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation of one premise against another becomes a matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion. Hence perhaps the slightly shrill tone of so much moral debate. (1981, p. 8)

Furthermore, MacIntyre points towards how such a conundrum often results in an inner uneasiness as we slowly come to recognize that underlying our passionately held convictions there is often some non-rational force at work. This "disquieting private arbitrariness" contributes to the shrill defensiveness that often accompanies modern moral discourse. Secondly, regardless of the above incommensurability, each side claims that their arguments are impersonal and wholly rational. This is necessary if the argument is to hold sway over the conscience of the other person. Simple personal preference does not provide valid grounds for common moral action. The third and final component of MacIntyre's tripartite characterization of modern moral discourse is the claim that the conceptually incommensurate premises of rival arguments have diverse historical origins. These premises have been extracted and isolated from the "larger totalities of theory and practice" in which they once played a specific function. This wider context is lost in the modern world, thus negating the ability to apply these concepts coherently and effectively. [¶10]

Both the inability to make progress in debates between incommensurate parties, as well as the realization that one cannot provide impersonal and rational justifications for one's premises leads to frustration and the "slightly shrill tone" of modern moral discourse. What is more, given the way our moral concepts have been removed from the contexts that had initially given them meaning and a coherent function, the prospect of making headway on this problem may seem bleak. However, Daniel Vokey has provided an account of how we might engage in productive moral discourse in our modern, pluralistic world. As such,

his work might provide a way to combat the incivility that is born out of the modern specter of incommensurability.

Vokey on Dialectical Discourse & Reflective Equilibrium

Although MacIntyre claims that modern moral discourse is characterized by incommensurability, such incommensurability is not complete and does not necessarily lead to a gross relativism, which denies any possibility of rationally demonstrating the superiority of one position over another. Rather, MacIntyre suggests a process of dialectical discourse for productively engaging in moral debate and inquiry. In his book *Moral Discourse in a Pluralistic World,* Daniel Vokey clarifies and expands upon MacIntyre's account of dialectical discourse by incorporating John Rawls' notion of wide reflective equilibrium into the process. It is Vokey's more detailed account that I will rely on here.

Vokey (2009) describes dialectical discourse as consisting of two distinct tasks. The first is to demonstrate that one's conceptual framework has the resources to

a) make progress on one or more theoretical and/or practical problems that representatives of the alternate position recognize as important, but cannot adequately address within the limitations of their conceptual framework; b) identify what is lacking in the alternative scheme that accounts for their failure; and c) offer some explanation for the alleged blind spots…within the alternative scheme. (p. 341)

The second task is to show that one's position shares all the advantages of the rival view and is not vulnerable to an alternate and similar critique from another position. [¶15]

The above process is undertaken according to the criteria set out in the notion of wide reflective equilibrium. Vokey defines the search for wide reflective equilibrium as a process of dialectical investigation in which the goal is to "achieve the most satisfactory set of agreements in a given context of enquiry and practice." The term satisfactory here implies that the elements of a given framework

a) are internally consistent and mutually supporting, b) contribute to and are consistent with the world view and way of life of the larger socio-historical context in which they are embedded, c) they assist in the accomplishment of the aims and objectives of the members of that community, and d) they are defensible in dialectical encounters with competing paradigms of inquiry. (Vokey, 2001, p. 92-93)

In short, wide reflective equilibrium is established when the greatest degree of coherence, consistency and effectiveness has been achieved in a given conceptual framework. This wide reflective equilibrium is then the means from which one demonstrates the superiority of one's position; that is, one argues that one's position embodies greater wide reflective equilibrium than the competing view. This approach provides a non-foundational, non-circular method of justification insofar as the initial

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premises can be subject to revision if they do not contribute to wide reflective equilibrium. In other words, the premises underdetermine further conclusions. This method does not guarantee that two rival frameworks will come to consensus as there are no criteria for assessing whether coherence, consistency or effectiveness should take precedence in any given case (Vokey, 2009). For example, one framework may be more consistent while the other is more effective in addressing a given problematic, thus leaving the two opposing parties in a stalemate. Nonetheless, this approach to moral discourse does provide some tangible means for making discourse more productive, even if it is not completely so.

Preconditions for Dialectical Discourse

Both MacIntyre and Vokey acknowledge that certain preconditions must be met in order for productive dialectical discourse to take place. First, rivals must recognize that dialectical discourse is an ongoing process and that any conclusions reached may at any time be open for further debate. Secondly, both parties must be open to the idea that the rival framework might hold conceptual resources that are able to provide more coherent, consistent and effective solutions to a give problem, such that by that frameworks own standards the rival position is superior. Third, dialectical discourse demands a reasonably developed sense of empathy, imagination and intellectual insight. In order to make a case against a rival framework, one must first come to a sophisticated intellectual understanding of the rival position not only through thorough study, but also through attempting to imaginatively and empathically take on the viewpoint of the rival framework in order to understand how members of that tradition are likely to interpret specific ethical situations (Vokey, 2001, p. 59-60). Of course, such an exercise is more heuristic than actual. As MacIntyre observed, the postmodern impulse to be a theoretical drifter, moving from tradition to tradition, is in fact to not be part of any of those traditions in any true and substantial way. Finally, Vokey discusses the need for a community that provides the concepts and standards that are necessary to engage in meaningful dialogue in the first place. Such a community demands virtues "such as fairness, generosity, diligence, courage, and creativity, as well as open-mindedness or some degree of 'epistemic humility'" (Vokey, 2009, p. 353). Such humility stems from each rival position being more dedicated to the honest pursuit of reflective equilibrium than to their respective framework "winning".

The above preconditions speak powerfully to the interconnection of moral education with the process of productive dialectical discourse. Without the development of personal virtue and the community necessary to make sense of and sustain said virtue, productive dialectical discourse is impossible. [¶20]

Implications for Education and Civility

Can the above aspects of MacIntyre's and Vokey's work contribute to educational practices which foster civility? To answer this question, it first needs to be broken down

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into its constituent parts. First, *knowledge of* the structure of modern moral discourse versus the *practice of* dialectical debate can be expected to have different effects on the manifestation of civility and each needs to be explored in turn. I will call this the *question of effectiveness,* or how likely it will be that each will contribute to civility. The question of effectiveness is ultimately an empirical question. As this paper is not engaged in empirical research, I will merely point out what I take to be good reasons to suppose that knowledge of the structure of modern moral discourse as well as the practice of dialectical discourse might lead to greater civility. Secondly, knowledge of modern moral discourse and practice of dialectical debate hold different normative presuppositions. As such, the appropriateness of each will differ depending on the educational context: public or private, secondary or post-secondary. I will call this the *question of suitability.* In other words, does engaging these ideas and practices run afoul of the norms of a given educational institution?

I will begin with the question of effectiveness. That the successful practice of dialectic discourse should lead to greater civility – all other things being equal – seems intuitively correct. If a given instance of dialectical discourse succeeds in garnering consensus on a given issue, then at least the conceptual source of interpersonal tension that gives rise to incivility has been removed. However, there is certainly no guarantee that dialectical discourse will lead to consensus. As noted above, there are no standards by which to prioritize the three criteria of coherence, consistency and effectiveness. Thus, dialectical discourse gives no means for navigating situations in which one position may be more coherent, but another position might be more effective; the resulting impasse leaves us back at MacIntyre's assertion/counter-assertion battle that can so easily lead to incivility. Furthermore, recall that dialectical debate presupposes a host of normative commitments and character traits. Debate is often a complex and trying activity in which one's most passionately held beliefs are, implicitly or explicitly, called into question. Even if the conditions are such that conceptually specific dialectical debate can potentially come to a civil resolution, if those involved do not have the character traits and abilities necessary to navigate and withstand the critiques leveled during debate, incivility will likely arise. It seems clear that while dialectical debate is no guarantee of civility, when mixed with the requisite character traits and abilities, it can in some instances be the means through which two opposing factions can come to consensus and thus avoid incivility.

Aside from the practice of dialectical discourse, knowledge of the structure of modern moral discourse on the part of those engaged in debate might in and of itself promote civility. A quick thought experiment might demonstrate this point. Imagine for a moment a time when you were working on a problem where you thought you understood the issue, and thought you were applying the proper methods to reach a given end…only the end was not manifesting. As you struggle you get increasingly annoyed. Questions arise: *Why isn't this working? This is the way it goes, why aren't I getting the proper result?* Or, in the case of moral debate: *Why can't they just see that I'm right? They're just ignorant.* Or, *they're just trying to be difficult.* Or worse yet, *they are just immoral, evil people.* With these thoughts come a rising impatience and frustration until this tension bubbles over into some form of uncivil behavior. Imagine now that you suddenly see what has been going on all along, you see how the structure of the material you have been dealing with inevitably leads to the frustrating outcome. The tension dissipates as understanding surfaces. The

problem ceases to be that *that person* is just being stubborn or ignorant or evil. Rather, the tension is seen as a result of the underlying structure of discourse. Namely, that both parties are employing sound arguments, but that their respective foundational premises differ and hence lead to different conclusions. Such a realization might not only alleviate blaming and demonization of the other, but might in fact foster solidarity and good will as one sees commonality in difference. That is, while each side's substantive positions differ, their methods are the same. Given that people tend to make positive self-assessments (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004), seeing that the other is employing the very same methods might bring one to assess the other more positively insofar as they are employing the same methods of argumentation. Perception of similarity also tends to promote empathic response (Sturmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006) which have been shown to motivate pro-social behavior (Batson, 2011). To be sure, this will likely only be a small motivational step towards civility, but given the current highly polemical nature of contemporary moral and political debate, we must take what small means of civility we can identify with the hope to build upon them more substantial conditions for civility.

The above considerations give us some reason to believe that knowledge of the structure of modern moral discourse as well as the practice of dialectical discourse will help foster civility in debate. I will now turn to the question of suitability. I will limit my discussion to public education institutions, beginning with post-secondary and moving on to secondary.

At the level of post-secondary education, discussion of MacIntyre's account of modern moral discourse as well as Vokey's account of dialectical debate are relatively unproblematic. Given the non-compulsory nature of public universities and colleges, their adult demographic, and the nearly universal goal of such institutions to foster citizens and professionals capable of navigating the turbulent waters of social and political life in a pluralist liberal democracy, engagement with MacIntyre and Vokey's work on these subjects is wholly in line with the norms of public post-secondary education. To be sure, the work of MacIntyre and Vokey should undoubtedly be explored in ethics courses simply in light of the fact that they offer a rejoinder to moral relativism and thus constitute an important chapter in the history of ethics. In regards to civility, applied and professional ethics courses that aim to prepare students for navigating real world ethical dilemmas are particularly fruitful venues for discussions of modern moral discourse and dialectical debate. Practitioners from all applied fields, from medicine and law to business and education, will inevitably be faced with ethical dilemmas and debates; some of which will be highly contentious and thus ideal conditions for incivility. If the above arguments for effectiveness are sound, then familiarity with the structure of modern moral discourse and dialectical debate could assist students in retaining civility in their professional capacities. [¶25]

Although the question of suitability poses no real challenge in post-secondary educational institutions, suitability becomes more of an issue in pre-college educational institutions. First, it is clear that the complexity of MacIntyre's and Vokey's work limits its applicability to those ages that posses sufficiently sophisticated cognitive abilities. In the great majority of cases this will be at the secondary school level, and likely the later

secondary school years. Even for older students, the work of MacIntyre and Vokey, as they stand, would likely prove too complex to be properly understood given the students' lack of background knowledge on the subject. However, in regards to MacIntyre's account of modern moral discourse, I believe this difficulty can be overcome by relaying the basic concepts and lines of argument of these works in less technical terms which nevertheless suffice to get the main ideas across. For example, although an in-depth discussion of foundationalist versus coherentist epistemologies might prove too advanced for the average high school student, the process of deduction is easily understood. From this initial understanding it is not hard demonstrate how two lines of deductive reasoning which hold conflicting foundational premises will not come to the same conclusions and – when pitted against each other in a naïve way – not produce any productive consensus. Of course, these remarks are only preliminary and speculative and the actual means and feasibility of such a project will rely heavily on the particular abilities of students and teachers. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that MacIntyre's account of modern moral discourse could be relayed to students in a way that is appropriate to there cognitive abilities and substantive knowledge.

While it might be possible explore the structure of modern moral discourse – and why much of it proves fruitless – in a secondary school setting, the problem of complexity is far more pressing in regards to dialectic debate and reflective equilibrium. Dialectical debate and wide reflective equilibrium necessitate a thorough knowledge of various ethical and political theories as well as knowledge of the pertinent empirical facts of a given topic. It seems unlikely that students will have a sophisticated enough understanding of these issues to engage them meaningfully. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that teacher education programs properly prepare teachers to engage these complex issues in a way that would do them justice.

Beyond the question of complexity, there is the second issue of legality. First, separation of church and state issues arise once we acknowledge that many students use religious frameworks to justify their moral stance on a given issue. Although there is some debate about whether liberal democracy necessarily implies separationism (Albert, 2005), generally speaking modern liberal democratic societies hold a basic commitment to some form of the principle. As such, public schools strive toward neutrality regarding religious debates, and take efforts to avoid actively promoting or critiquing students' religious beliefs. This basic commitment has been interpreted in various ways and its interpretation continues to be a source of tension in may liberal democratic societies.[1] For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to delve into the various interpretations of this commitment. It is sufficient to note that the separation of church and state is often understood by parents to mean that the religious convictions they are trying to inculcate in their children will not encounter undue opposition from public school curriculum, nor will the children of agnostic or atheist parents have to deal with proselytization from the curriculum or school employees.

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[1] *Mozert v. Hawkins City Board of Education,* and *Wisconsin v Yoder* stand as exemplars of this tension in the United States. More recently, the passing of the "anti-veil" law by France's parliament and the ensuing uproar highlighted the ongoing and heated disputes over how to interpret separationism in liberal democratic societies.

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Given the above, it is clear how the practice of dialectical discourse on moral issues would be problematic in secondary schools. Many parents would likely object to their children being exposed to alternate religious perspectives, as well as the students' religious convictions being entered into a dialectic debate that employs comparison and critique. Furthermore, parents might have objections to their children imaginatively stepping into the shoes of an adherent of another religion. It is arguable that such a practice might confuse or trouble the student and undermine the parents attempt to raise their child in their particular religious tradition. These difficulties are substantial and likely make the practice of dialectical debate about moral matters untenable in secondary education institutions. However, although the practice of dialectical debate on moral issues cannot be undertaken in the classroom, the method could be discussed in order to make students aware of its existence. Both religious and non-religious students may find the method insightful and useful, and might wish to use it in moral debates outside of the classroom.

While the practice of dialectical discourse fails to meet the suitability requirement in the context of public k-12 education, *knowledge of* MacIntyre's account of the structure of modern moral discourse does not hold the same normative complications and hence is less problematic in this context. MacIntyre's account of modern moral discourse is purely descriptive and does not in and of itself make any normative demands on how best to deal with this dilemma. Teachers could discuss MacIntyre's account and employ rudimentary discourse analyses with students to show how ethical debate can break down and lead to incivility. As already discussed, awareness of the structure of modern moral discourse can in itself help combat incivility. Furthermore, such knowledge can help students to be more skillful and self-aware as they begin to engage with the complex ethical issues inherent in life as a citizen of a pluralist liberal democracy. [¶30]

Concluding Thoughts

This article began by offering examples of gross incivility spanning from parliamentary bodies down to k-12 institutions. I moved on to argue that knowledge of the structure of modern moral discourse and the practice of dialectical discourse could help allay such incivility. However, one could object that this suggestion assumes that the aim of those involved in debate is to come to some honest, coherent consensus. This could be seen as a hopelessly naïve view. Rather than being a quest for coherent and effective consensus, such debates could be interpreted as competitive, self-interested struggles over power and scarce resources. If this were to be the case, there is little incentive for competing parties to adopt the method of dialectical discourse or even to seek to maintain civility if incivility and barbarism are more effect means of reaching their given ends.

Two responses can be offered to this objection. First, my initial conceptualization of the problem assumed that the debate is proceeding between parties dedicated to identifying a coherent and effective consensus. So in this sense the objection misses the mark insofar as it is an objection to an argument I am not making; namely, that knowledge of the structure of modern moral discourse and the practice of dialectical discourse are effective

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means for negating incivility between groups not already dedicated to the basic norms implicit in dialectical discourse. As was pointed out in the section on the necessity of moral education for the effectiveness of dialectical discourse, certain normative commitments and habits are a prerequisite to my discussion of the effectiveness question.

The second response is related to the first and is simply this: if many modern moral and political debates are accurately characterized as self-interested struggles for resources and power, then this is all the more reason to dedicate educational resources to the development of the requisite values and abilities needed for engagement in dialectical discourse. Pointing out the self-interested, manipulative nature of much moral and political debate does not mean that we should shift our methods of debate to suite this state of affairs. Rather, awareness of the nature of moral and political debate should motivate us to pursue educational policies and practices that aim at combating this mode of debate.

The field of education often seeks to combat uncivil behavior through either through direct inculcation of more social habits, or through the development of social-emotional skills. While these efforts – when undertaken in a empirically and philosophically rigorous manner – are certainly to be applauded, they fail to give students the skills and knowledge concerning the structure of modern moral discourse and the methods necessary to navigate this structure in a civil and productive manner. I have argued that this project can be pursued to varying degrees depending upon the educational context. Admittedly, pursuing such a project will involve placing yet another task on the already substantial to-do list of post-secondary teachers. However, given the severity of the global issues we currently face, and the increasingly pluralistic contexts in which we must cooperate to solve these issues, the time and resources necessary on the part of our educational institutions may be well worth the investment.

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